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I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Recovering Litigation Costs from the NLRB Under the Equal Access to
Justice Act
The high cost of litigation may deter individuals and organizations from
seeking judicial review of governmental actions that lack reasonable bases in
law or fact.' Congress enacted the Equal Access to Justice Act2 (Act) to en-
courage individuals and organizations to resist unreasonable governmental
intrusion.3 Section 203 of the Act allows eligible parties4 who prevail' in agency
adversarial proceedings to recover attorney fees and expenses from the federal
1. See 5 U.S.C. § 504 note (Supp. V 1981) (congressional finding that expense of litigation
deters parties from defending against unreasonable government conduct). Governmental action
is unreasonable within the meaning of the Equal Access to Justice Act (Act) if on review the
government cannot substantially justify its positions in underlying agency actions or civil litiga-
tion. Id. § 504 (a)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(IXA) (Supp. V 1981); see infra note 9 and accompany-
ing text (substantially justified standard is essentially test of reasonableness).
2. Equal Access to Justice Act, PuB. L. No. 96-481, Title II, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980), codified
at 5 U.S.C. § 504 (Supp. V 1981), 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (Supp. V 1981).
3. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96TH CONG., 2D SEss. 5-6, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4984 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 1418]. The disparity of resources between
the federal government and individuals magnifies the economic deterrent to contesting govern-
mental action. Id. at 4988. The purpose of the Act is to diminish the economic deterrent to con-
testing governmental actions by providing for the award of attorney fees and expenses. H.R.
REP. No. 1434, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 21, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5003,
5010 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 1434]; see infra notes 6 & 13 (fees and expenses recoverable
under Act).
4. 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1981). The Act defines eligible parties as individuals
whose net worth does not exceed $1 million and unincorporated businesses; partnerships, cor-
porations, associations, and public or private organizations whose net worth does not exceed
$5 million. Id. The Act excludes, however, certain cooperative associations and tax-exempt organiza-
tions from the $5 million net worth limitation. Id.; see 12 U.S.C. § 1141(j)(a) (1976 & Supp.
V 1981) (farmer cooperative associations exempt from Act's $5 million net worth limitation);
26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (community organizations serving educational, religious,
or charitable purposes may be exempt from Act's $5 million net worth limitation). Net worth
within the meaning of the Act is total assets less total liabilities. H.R. RP. No. 1418, supra
note 3, at 4994. The Act also excludes unincorporated businesses, partnerships, corporations,
associations, or organizations having more than 500 employees. 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(B) (Supp.
V 1981); 28 U.S.C § 2412(d)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1981). Congress designed the Act's eligibility re-
quirements to limit the Act to individuals and small businesses for whom the cost of litigation
may deter the vindication of rights. H.R. RP. No. 1418, supra note 3, at 4994.
5. 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981). In ensuring that parties have sufficient resources
to contest governmental actions, Congress intended the Act's reference to prevailing parties to
be consistent with the law that has developed around existing fee recovery legislation. See H.R.
REP. 1418, supra note 3, at 4990; see also Bradley v. School Bd. City of Richmond, 416 U.S.
696, 721-23 (1974) (party may prevail for purposes of fee award even though party does not
prevail on all issues); Foster v. Boorstin, 561 F.2d 340, 342-43 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (party may prevail
for purposes of fee award if party obtains favorable settlement of case); Van Hoomissen v. Xerox
Corp., 503 F.2d 1131, 1133 (9th Cir. 1974) (party prevailing on interlocutory appeal was prevail-
ing party for purposes of fee award); Corcoran v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 121 F.2d 575,
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
government. 6 The Act provides that agencies conducting adjudicative proceed-
ings7 will award fees and expenses to prevailing parties unless the agency's
adjudicative officer8 finds that the agency's position in the proceeding was
substantially justified 9 or that special circumstances make an award unjust.' 0
576 (9th Cir. 1941) (defendant may prevail if plaintiff seeks voluntary dismissal of groundless
point); Parker v. Matthews, 411 F. Supp. 1059, 1064 (D.D.C. 1976) (party may recover fee award
by prevailing on interim order central to case), aff'd 561 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
6. 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981). The Act defines fees and expenses to include
the expense of expert witnesses, the cost of any study or analysis, and attorney fees that the
agency's adjudicative officer finds to be reasonable and necessary for the party's case against
the agency. Id. § 504(b)(1)(A). The Act, however, will not compensate attorneys at a rate in
excess of $75 per hour or expert witnesses at a rate in excess of the highest rate of compensation
for agency witnesses. Id. Congress intended the award of fees and expenses to act as an ad-
ministrative remedy to unreasonable governmental action. H.R. REP. 1418, supra note 3, at 4991;
see Rowe, The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J.
651, 653-66 (rationales underlying fee-shifting legislation).
7. 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(C) (Supp. V 1981). The Act defines adversary adjudications as
administrative proceedings in which counsel represent the position of the United States. Id.; see
id. § 554(a) (adversary adjudications to which Act applies). Congress intended for the Act's definition
of adversary adjudication to preclude fee awards when an agency does not take a position in
the adjudication. See H.R. REP. No. 1434, supra note 3, at 5012.
8. See 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(D) (Supp. V 1981). The Act defines "adjudicative officer"
to be the deciding official who presides at the adversary adjudication whether or not the deciding
official possesses the designation of administrative law judge, hearing officer, examiner, or otherwise.
Id.
9. Id. § 504(a)(1). The test of whether or not an agency's action is substantially justified
is one of reasonableness. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 3, at 4989. The adjudicative officer
may award parties fees unless the governmental agency's case had a reasonable basis in law and
fact. Id. The fact that the government lost in the adversary adjudication, however, does not
raise a presumption that the government's position was not substantially justified. Id. at 4990.
Nor does the "substantially justified" standard require the agency to show that the agency based
its decision to litigate on a substantial probability of prevailing. Id. Congress designed the "substan-
tially justified" standard merely to balance the executive's obligation to execute the laws against
the public's interest in vindicating rights. Id. at 4989.
10. 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981). Congress did not intend for the Act to deter govern-
ment agencies from advancing novel but credible interpretations of the law and therefore Con-
gress included within the Act a "special circumstances" exception. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra
note 3, at 4990. The special circumstances exception gives an adjudicative officer discretion to
deny awards when equitable considerations mitigate against an award of fees. Id. For instance,
an adjudicative officer may reduce or deny an award of fees when a party seeking a fee award
unreasonably protracted the adjudicative proceeding and thus delayed resolution of the matter
in controversy. 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(3) (Supp. V '1981).
To recover a fee award, a party must submit within 30 days of a final disposition in the
adversary adjudication an application to the administrative law judge presiding at the adjudica-
tion which states that the party is a prevailing party and is eligible to receive an award under
the Act. Id. § 504(a)(2). The application must itemize the fees and expenses the party seeks to
recover and must allege that the position of the agency at the adversary adjudication was not
substantially justified. Id. The adjudicative officer of the agency who presided at the adversary
adjudication may deny, reduce, or award the fees that a party seeks to recover. Id. § 504(a)(3).
While a party dissatisfied with the adjudicative officer's fee award may petition to appeal the
fee award to the federal court that has jurisdiction to review the merits of the underlying decision
of the agency adjudication, the adjudicative officer may deny the petition to appeal after which
a party may take no further appeal. Id. § 504(c)(2). After an administrative law judge or court
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Section 2412 of the Act allows eligible parties" who prevail in civil actions
against the federal government' 2 to recover fees and expenses 3 irrespective
of whether the party or the government brought the underlying action.1" The
Act provides that courts will award fees and expenses to parties who have
prevailed in civil litigation against the government unless the court finds that
the government's position was substantially justified or that special cir-
cumstances make an award unjust.' 5 Congress designed the Act to balance
the litigation resources available to parties and to the government' 6 and to
insure that parties base the decision to contest government actions on the merits
of the case rather than on the cost of litigation.' 7 In Tyler Business Services,
has determined that a party is entitled to an award of fees, agencies will pay fee awards from
any funds that are available to the agency. Id. § 504(d)(1).
11. See supra note 4 (parties eligible under Act).
12. See supra note 5 (prevailing parties within meaning of Act). The Act's references to
the United States or the government includes any federal agency and any official of the United
States acting in his or her official capacity. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(c) (Supp. V. 1981).
13. See 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1981). The Act defines fees and expenses to in-
clude the expense of expert witnesses, the cost of any study or analysis, and attorney fees that
the court finds to be reasonable and necessary for the party's case against the government. Id.
The Act, however, will not compensate attorneys at a rate in excess of $75 per hour or expert
witnesses at a rate in excess of the highest rate of compensation for government witnesses. Id.
14. See id. § 2412(d)(l)(A). Parties formerly could recover attorney fees against the United
States only in accordance with specific statutory authorization. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1976), amended
by 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1981); see Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y,
421 U.S. 240, 260-61 n.33 (1975) (list of statutes specifically authorizing parties to recover at-
torney fees). The Act thus constitutes a federal exception to the "American rule" which holds
that prevailing litigants may not collect attorney fees from losing parties. See Arcambel v. Wiseman,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306, 306 (1796) (general practice of United States is in opposition to inclusion
of attorney fees as damages absent express statutory authorization). The Supreme Court, however,
has reaffirmed the American rule by holding that absent authorizing statutes litigants must pay
their own attorney fees. See F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129-31 (1974)
(parties must address to Congress arguments for departure from American rule); Hall v. Cole,
412 U.S. 1, 4 (1973) (American rule disfavors allowance for attorney fees absent statutory authoriza-
tion); see also Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122
U. PA. L. REv. 636, 648-55 (1974) (criticizing American rule).
15. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1981). A party seeking a fee award must within
30 days of a final judgment submit to the court an application which states that the party is
a prevailing party and eligible to receive an award under the Act. Id. § 2412(d)(1)(B). The ap-
plication must itemize the fees and expenses the party seeks to recover and must allege that the
position of the Untied States in the underlying judicial proceeding was not substantially justified.
Id. § 2412(d)(1)(B).
16. 5 U.S.C. § 504 note (Supp. V 1981) (congressional finding that government possesses
greater legal expertise and resources than individuals). Congress determined that the standard
for an award of fees against the United States should be different from the standard governing
fee awards against private litigants because of the government's greater resources and expertise.
Id. The disparity between the resources and expertise of individuals and their government magnifies
the economic deterrent to contesting governmental action. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 3,
at 4984 (Act reduces economic disparity between government and individuals by entitling certain
parties to recover litigation costs); see 126 CONG. REc. H. 10219 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1980) (remarks
of Rep. McDade) (Act balances scales of justice for first time in decades).
17. 5 U.S.C. § 504 note (Supp. V 1981). The expense of securing the vindication of rights
may deter certain individuals and organizations from defending against unreasonable govern-
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Inc. v. NLRB,"1 the Fourth Circuit recently granted civil litigation costs to
a party who had prevailed against the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB
or Board) during a proceeding before an administrative law judge and during
civil litigation before the Fourth Circuit."
In Tyler, the Regional Director of the Board (Director) alleged in his com-
plaint against Tyler Business Services, Inc. that Tyler's discharge of Burton
Lane, an employee, was wrongful and violated the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA).20 The Director accused Tyler of terminating Lane's employment
for comments Lane allegedly made while on a date with an important Tyler
customer.2 An administrative law judge dismissed the Director's wrongful
discharge claim for lack of proof. 22 The NLRB, which reviews administrative
hearing rulings, rejected the administrative law judge's finding with respect
to the Director's determination on the wrongful discharge claim and held that
Tyler's dismissal of Lane for remarks that Lane allegedly made violated the
NLRA because the remarks were "protected concerted activity." ' 23 The Board
ordered Tyler to take certain affirmative actions including the reinstatement
mental action. Id. In allowing for fee awards, the Act provides an alternative to complying with
unreasonable governmental action or to litigating against the government to a party's financial
detriment. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 3, at 4991.
18. 695 F.2d 73 (4th Cir. 1982).
19. Id. at 77.
20. Tyler Business Serv., 256 N.L.R.B. 567, 570 (1981). The Regional Director of the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) issued a complaint on February 13, 1980, alleging that
Tyler's firing of Lane violated § 8(a)(1) and § 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3) (1976). The NLRA provides that it is illegal for an employer
to interfere with or restrain an employee's tight to engage in bargaining activities for the mutual
benefit of employees. Id. § 158(a)(1). The NLRB complaint also charged that Tyler violated §
8(a)(1) of the NLRA by threatening on two occasions to fire employees if the employees chose
union representation. 256 N.L.R.B. at-570; see 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976) (employer may not
discourage membership in labor organization).
21. 256 N.L.R.B. at 571-73. With respect to the Board's determination that Lane's conver-
sation with a Tyler customer constituted protected concerted activity, Lane's comments to the
Tyler customer consisted of a rumored romantic affair involving Tyler's president and Lane's
personal concern that Tyler's part-time employees did not receive hospitalization benefits. Id. at 571.
22. Id. at 572-73. In considering the Board's allegation that Tyler violated the NLRA by
threatening to fire employees if they chose union representation, the administrative law judge
dismissed the Board's complaint for lack of proof. Id. at 573. The NLRB affirmed the administrative
law judge's findings to the extent that Tyler had not violated the NLRA by threatening to fire
employees for choosing union representation. Id. at 567-68. With respect to the Board's allega-
tion thatTyler fired Lane for engaging in protected concerted activity, the administrative law
judge similarly dismissed the Board's complaint for lack of proof and held that Lane had not
engaged in concerted activity while speaking to Tyler's customer. Id. at 573; see infra note 23
and accompanying text (NLRB, however, overruled administrative law judge's findings with respect
to wrongful discharge claim and held that Tyler violated NLRA by firing Lane for engaging
in protected concerted activities).
23. 256 N.L.R.B. at 567-69. The Board held that Tyler violated § 8(a)(l) of the NLRA
by terminating Lane for comments Lane made while on a date with a Tyler customer. Id.; see
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976) (employer may not interfere with employee's right to engage in activities
for mutual benefit of employees). While the majority of Lane's conversation with the Tyler customer
was of a personal nature, Lane had stated that Tyler treated part-time employees unfairly by
not providing them hospitalization benefits. 256 N.L.R.B. at 571; see supra note 21 (Lane's con-
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of Lane.2" Tyler thereafter petitioned the Fourth Circuit to review the Board's
finding that Tyler had violated the NLRA by discharging Lane for engaging
in protected concerted activity.2 - The NLRB, in response to Lane's petition
for review of the Board's findings, cross-petitioned the Fourth Circuit for en-
forcement of the Board's order requiring the reinstatement of Lane.26 The
Fourth Circuit held, however, that the Board's evidence that Lane had at-
tempted to benefit Tyler employees through conversation with the Tyler
customer was insufficient to sustain a finding that Lane was engaged in pro-
tected concerted activity.27 Initially, the Fourth Circuit found that protected
concerted activity is activity that involves an employee's attempt to enforce
a bargaining agreement, to induce group action, or to act on behalf of other
employees. 28 Based on Lane's testimony before the administrative law judge
that he was not attempting to enlist the customer's aid or sympathy on behalf
of Tyler employees,2 9 the Fourth Circuit concluded that the record did not
versation with customer). The Board stated that Lane's comment concerning part-time employee
hospitalization benefits did not lose its protection under the NLRA either because the comment
was unfounded or because Lane's other comments to the Tyler customer might have embarrassed
Lane's employer. 256 N.L.R.B. at 568. The Board held that because Lane expressed his concern
that Tyler's hospitalization benefits did not extend to part-time employees, Lane's expression
was protected concerted activity within the meaning of the NLRA. Id. at 567-68; see Community
Hosp. of Roanoke Valley v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 607, 610 (4th Cir. 1976) (NLRA protects statements
directly related to concerted activities); 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976) (employer may not discharge
employee for engaging in activity that contemplates employees' aid or protection). But see infra
notes 28-30 (Lane stated that he did not make statements to Tyler customer with intention of
benefitting Tyler employees).
24. Tyler Business Serv., 256 N.L.R.B. at 568-69. Tyler had offered to reinstate Lane on
February 11, 1980, two days before the Board's Regional Director issued a complaint against
Tyler. Id. at 570. Lane accepted Tyler's offer of reinstatement. Id. In addition to requiring reinstate-
ment of Lane, the Board's order also required Tyler to make Lane whole for any loss of earnings
and to make available to the Board company records concerning Lane's back pay. Id. at 569-70.
Finally, the Board's order required Tyler to post notices which stated that Tyler had violated
the NLRA by discharging an employee for engaging in protected concerted activity. Id.; see 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976) (employer may not discriminate against employees for engaging in con-
duct that contemplates group action).
25. Tyler Business Serv. v. NLRB, 680 F.2d 338, 339 (4th Cir. 1982).
26. Id.; see supra note 24 (present litigation concerns requirements of Board's order other
than Lane's reinstatement).
27. 680 F.2d at 339. In finding insufficient evidence to support the Board's finding that
Tyler violated the NLRA by discharging Lane for engaging in concerted activity, the Fourth Cir-
cuit noted that Lane had no recollection of discussing hospitalization benefits with the Tyler
customer. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 158(al) (1976) (NLRA protects employee's activities that con-
template group action or mutual benefit); infra notes 28-30 and accompanying text (no evidence
of Lane's involvement in activities for mutual benefit of employees).
28. 680 F.2d at 339. Since Lane stated that he had not intended to benefit Tyler employees
in speaking to the Tyler customer, the Fourth Circuit held that an employee's expression of per-
sonal concerns must contemplate group action or mutual benefit to constitute concerted activity.
Id.; see Blaw-Knox Foundry & Mill Mach. Inc. v. NLRB, 646 F.2d 113, 116 (4th Cir. 1981)
(employee does not engage in concerted activity by manifesting personal concern).
29. 680 F.2d at 339; see Tyler Business Serv., 256 N.L.R.B. 567, 573 (1981) (administrative
law judge's finding that Lane made comments to customer of Tyler with intention of maligning
Tyler's president and not of helping company employees).
1984]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
support the Board's position that Tyler discharged Lane for engaging in pro-
tected concerted activity.3" Following the Fourth Circuit's denial of the Board's
order requiring Tyler to reinstate Lane, Tyler petitioned the Fourth Circuit
to recover attorney fees and expenses that he had incurred in both the ad-
ministrative and civil proceedings pursuant to the Act. 3' While the Fourth Cir-
cuit awarded Tyler the fees and expenses he had incurred during litigation
before the Fourth Circuit, the court denied Tyler the fees and expenses that
he had incurred in preparation for an NLRB hearing before an administration
law judge.
32
In deciding to award Tyler attorney fees that he had incurred in civil litiga-
tion before the Fourth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit examined whether the Board's
"position was substantially justified" 33 within the meaning of the Act.3 4 Under
the Act, Tyler could recover fees and expenses only if the Board's position
was not substantially justified. 3" , The Fourth Circuit noted that during the
NLRB's review of the administrative law judge's disposition of Lane's wrongful
discharge claim, the NLRB had ignored Lane's testimony that he had not en-
gaged in protected concerted activity while speaking to the Tyler customer.
36
The Fourth Circuit thus determined that the Board's position was not substan-
tially justified because the NLRB had failed to present a reasonable factual
30. 680 F.2d at 339. Significant to the Fourth Circuit's denial of the Board's order requir-
ing the reinstatement of Lane was Lane's testimony that he had not attempted to enlist the customer's
aid or sympathy in making comments about Tyler Business Services. Id.; see supra notes 23 &
28 (concerted activity must contemplate group action or mutual benefit and may not be of purely
personal nature).
31. Tyler Business Serv. v. NLRB, 695 F.2d 73-74 (4th Cir. 1982). To recover a fee award
under the Act, a party must within 30 days of a final disposition in an agency or civil proceeding
submit an application to the court which states that the party is a prevailing party and eligible
to receive an award of fees. See 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(2) (Supp. V 1981). (procedure for recovering
fees from government agency); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1981) (procedure for recover-
ing fees from government in civil proceedings); supra notes 10 & 15 (summary of procedures
for recovering fees following agency and civil adjudications).
32. 695 F.2d at 76-77. The Fourth Circuit stated that the effective date of the Act barred
Tyler's recovery of fees that Tyler had incurred in preparation for the NLRB administrative pro-
ceeding. Id. at 77; see infra note 75 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit denied expenses relating
to NLRB administrative proceeding because agency proceeding concluded prior to effective date
of Act).
33. 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1981); see
supra note 9 (substantially justified standard is essentially test of reasonableness).
34. 695 F.2d at 75.
35. See 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981) (parties may recover litigation costs from federal
agency if agency cannot substantially justify agency conduct); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (Supp.
V 1981) (parties may recover litigation costs from government if government's litigation position
is not substantially justified).
36. 695 F.2d at 76. In determining that Tyler had not violated the NLRA by terminating
Lane for comments Lane made to a Tyler customer, the Fourth Circuit stated that the Board's
general counsel had not offered a reasonable explanation for Lane's disclaimer of involvement




basis for alleging that Tyler discharged Lane for engaging in protected con-
certed activity.
3'
In determining that the NLRB's position that Tyler terminated Lane for
engaging in protected concerted activity was not substantially justified, the
Fourth Circuit considered whether the Act refers to the government's position
at the agency level or the government's position in subsequent civil litigation. 38
The Fourth Circuit concluded that the Act refers to the government's position
as a party at whatever adversary proceeding, administrative or civil, for which
a litigant seeks to recover related fees and expenses." Accordingly, Tyler was
eligible to recover fees and expenses that he had incurred at both the NLRB
and Fourth Circuit proceedings since the Board could not prove at either the
NLRB or Fourth Circuit proceedings that Lane had been engaged in protected
concerted activity."0 Despite Lane's eligibility to recover fees and expenses
relating to the NLRB proceeding, the Fourth Circuit denied recovery of fees
that Tyler incurred at the NLRB proceeding because the NLRB proceeding
concluded prior to the effective date of the Act."' The Fourth Circuit thus
awarded Tyler only the fees that he had incurred during litigation before the
Fourth Circuit. 42 In addition, the Fourth Circuit noted that Tyler's recovery
also could include fees that Tyler had incurred in preparing and prosecuting
the motion for attorney fees.
4 3
37. 695 F.2d at 76; see supra note 30 (Lane had denied involvement in concerted activity
while speaking to Tyler customer).
38. 695 F.2d at 75. In determining whether the government's position wa substantially
justified, the Tyler court did not need to determine whether the Act focuses on the government's
position during agency level proceedings or the government's position in subsequent civil litiga-
tion. See Goldhaber v. Foley, 698 F.2d 193, 196 (3d Cir. 1983) (court need not resolve which
government position Act focuses upon unless government changes its position before or after
complaint); Operating Eng'rs Local Union v. Bohn, 541 F. Supp. 486, 495 (C.D. Utah 1982)
(distinction between which government position court should focus on in determining if govern-
ment's position was substantially justified becomes important only when agency changes its posi-
tion). In Tyler, the Board's position did not change from the Board's original complaint to the
subsequent Fourth Circuit litigation. Compare Tyler Business Serv., 256 N.L.R.B. 567, 570 (1981)
(Regional Director's complaint that Tyler fired Lane for engaging in protected concerted activity)
i'ith Tyler Business Serv. v. NLRB, 680 F.2d 338, 339 (4th Cir. 1982) (Board finding that Tyler
violated NLRA by firing Lane for engaging in protected concerted activity).
39. Tyler Business Serv. v. NLRB, 695 F.2d 73, 75 (4th Cir. 1982).
40. Id. at 76 (Tyler sought recovery of fees that he had incurred at administrative pro-
ceedings before Board in addition to expenses of litigation against NLRB before Fourth Circuit).
But see infra note 41 and accompanying test (effective date of Act bars recovery of Tyler's agency
proceeding expenses).
41. 695 F.2d at 77. The Act applies to adversary adjudications and civil actions pending
on or commencing after October 1, 1981. 5 U.S.C. § 504 note (Supp. V 1981). The Fourth Circuit
did not award expenses relating to the administrative hearing because Tyler's proceedings before
the NLRB concluded on August 17, 1981. 695 F.2d at 77; see 5 U.S.C. § 504 note (Supp. V
1981) (effective date of Act is October 1, 1981); infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text (agency
adjudication and subsequent civil litigation are not same continuous proceeding for purpose of
determining whether case was pending on Act's effective date).
42. 695 F.2d at 77; see supra note 13 (Act limits fee recovery).
43. 695 F.2d at 77. But see supra notes 10 & 15 and accompanying text (court has discre-
19841
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The Fourth Circuit was correct in awarding attorney fees and expenses
to Tyler because the NLRB failed to present evidence to support the Board's
complaint that Tyler fired Lane for engaging in protected concerted activity.1
4
Since Lane denied at the administrative hearing that he had engaged in con-
certed activity while speaking to the Tyler customer, the Board's position that
Lane had engaged in protected concerted activity was not substantially justified
at either the administrative or the judicial levels. 45 Notwithstanding a possible
labor-related conversation between Lane and the Tyler customer, the Fourth
Circuit previously has held that when an employee acts on a matter of per-
sonal concern without the intention of benefitting a group, the employee is
not engaged in protected concerted activity within the meaning of the NLRA.
46
Other circuits that have ruled on the issue of protected concerted activity sup-
port the Fourth Circuit in holding that an employee must seek to enforce a
bargaining agreement or to induce group action to constitute protected activity
within the meaning of the NLRA.
4
1
To the extent that evidence does not appear in the record to support the
Board's allegation that Tyler fired Lane for engaging in protected concerted
tion to reduce or deny fee award if special circumstances make award unjust).
44. See 695 F.2d at 76 (NLRB failed to refute Lane's testimony that he was not engaged
in protected concerted activity while on date with Tyler's customer); Tyler Business Serv. v. NLRB,
680 F.2d 338, 339 (4th Cir. 1982) (insufficient evidence that Lane engaged in concerted action
while speaking to Tyler's customer); Tyler Business Serv., 256 N.L.R.B. 567, 573 (1981) (Lane
made comments to Tyler's customer to malign Tyler and not to benefit company employees);
supra note 15 (court will award fees to prevailing parties when government's litigation position
was not substantially justified).
45. See Tyler Business Serv. v. NLRB, 680 F.2d 338, 339 (4th Cir. 1982) (record lacks
evidentiary support for Board ruling that Tyler discharged Lane for engaging in protected con-
certed activity); Tyler Business Serv., 256 N.L.R.B. 567, 573 (1981) (NLRB failed to prove allega-
tion that Tyler fired Lane for engaging in protected concerted activity).
46. See Blaw-Knox Foundry & Mill Mach. Inc. v. NLRB, 646 F.2d 113, 115-16 (4th Cir.
1981). In Blaw-Knox Foundry & Mill Mach., Inc. v. NLRB, the Fourth Circuit held that when
an employee's altercation with his employer manifests a purely personal concern, evidence does
not support a finding that an employer violated the NLRA by discharging an employee for engaging
in protected concerted activity. Id. at 116. In Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. NLRB, the Fourth
Circuit held that the Board failed to establish that an employer violated the NLRA by firing
an employee for engaging in protected concerted activity when an employee's action did not in-
tend or contemplate group action. 635 F.2d 304, 310 (4th Cir. 1980).
47. See Ontario Knife Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 840, 844-46 (2d Cir. 1980) (employer did
not violate NLRA in discharging employee because employee's actions did not contemplate group
action); Pelton Casteel, Inc. v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 23, 28-29 (7th Cir. 1980) (employer's actions
must contemplate group activity to constitute concerted activity); ARO, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d
713, 718 (6th Cir. 1979) (employee's complaint must have object of inducing group action to
amount to concerted action); Randolph Division, Ethan Allen, Inc. v. NLRB, 513 F.2d 706,
708 (1st Cir. 1975) (employee's conduct must appear with object of inducing group action to
be concerted activity); NLRB v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 481 F.2d 714, 718 (5th Cir. 1973)
(concerted activity must appear with object of initiating or inducing group action); NLRB v.
Selwyn Shoe Mfg. Corp., 428 F.2d 217, 221 (8th Cir. 1970) (concerted activities include exercise
of rights that appear in collective bargaining agreement); Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330
F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964) (employee who spoke to other employees concerning their rights
but without contemplation of group action did not engage in concerted activity).
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activity, Tyler is similar to Wolverton v. Schweiker.18 In Wolverton, the
Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary) denied disability benefits
to a claimant because the Secretary alleged that the claimant was capable of
light and sedentary jobs.4 9 The United States District Court for the District
of Idaho in Wolverton held that the Secretary's denial of disability benefits
to the claimant was not substantially justified because no evidence appeared
in the record to suggest that the plaintiff was capable of light and sedentary
jobs. 0 The Wolverton court thus awarded the claimant attorney fees and
expenses pursuant to the Act."1 Similarly, because the Fourth Circuit in Tyler
found no evidence in the record to support the Board's determination that
Lane had engaged in protected concerted activity while speaking to the Tyler
customer, the Board's position that Tyler terminated Lane for engaging in
protected concerted activity was not substantially justified and therefore the
Act entitled Tyler to recover litigation costs from the NLRB.
52
The Third Circuit in Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA3 criticized
the Tyler court for focusing exclusively on the NLRB's civil litigation position
in finding that the NLRB's position that Tyler fired Lane for engaging in
protected concerted activities was not substantially justified.54 In determining
48. 533 F. Supp. 420 (D. Idaho 1982).
49. Id. at 425.
50. Id. In denying social security disability benefits to a claimant, an administrative law
judge in Wolverton v. Schweiker had relied on a vocational consultant's answer to a hypothetical
question to find that the claimant could perform certain light and sedentary jobs. Id. The United
States District Court for the District of Idaho in Wolverton found, however, no evidence in the
record to support the administrative law judge's finding that the claimant was capable of light
and sedentary jobs. Id.
51. Id. at 425-26. In finding that the Secretary of Health and Human Services had not
substantially justified his position that a plaintiff was capable of light and sedentary jobs, the
Wolverton court awarded those attorney fees the plaintiff had incurred in civil litigation before
federal district court. Id. at 426; see 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1981) (court may award
prevailing parties fees and expenses of litigation if government's position was not substantially
justified). The Wolverton court, however, did not award fees that the claimant had incurred
in an underlying social security administrative hearing because the Act does not cover agency
adjudications in which counsel do not represent the government's position during the adjudicative
proceeding. 533 F. Supp. at 424; see H.R. RP. No. 1434, supra note 3, at 5012 (social security
hearings are not adversary adjudications because counsel do not represent government during
adjudication).
52. Compare Wolverton v. Schweiker, 533 F. Supp. 420, 425-26 (D. Idaho 1982) (when
record lacked any factual evidence to support government's position, government's position was
not substantially justified) with Tyler Business Serv. v. NLRB, 695 F.2d 75, 76 (4th Cir. 1982)
(since NLRB presented no evidence that Tyler fired Lane for engaging in protected concerted
activity, Board's position was not substantially justified).
53. 703 F.2d 700 (3d Cir. 1983).
54. Id. at 706. The Third Circuit in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA may
have confused the Fourth Circuit's holding in Tyler with the holdings of the Fifth and District
of Columbia Circuits that focused exclusively on the government's civil litigation position in deter-
mining whether the government's position was substantially justified. See Broad Ave. Laundry
& Tailoring v. United States, 693 F.2d 1387, 1390-91 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (Act's substantially justified
standard focuses on government's civil litigating position and not on government's administrative
hearing position); S&H Riggers & Erectors, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n,
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that the Environmental Protection Agency's postponement of amendments
to the Clean Water Act 55 was not substantially justified, the Natural Resources
court held that for purposes of determining whether the government's posi-
tion was substantially justified a court should focus on the government's posi-
tion at the agency level rather than on the government's position in subse-
quent civil litigation. 6 The Natural Resources court stated that the Tyler court's
focus on the government's civil litigation position would mean that no matter
how outrageously an agency had acted during an administrative hearing, the
Act would not apply so long as the agency conducted itself reasonably in subse-
quent civil litigation.5 The Third Circuit in Natural Resources misconstrued,
however, not only the Fourth Circuit's holding in Tyler but also the terms
of the Act.5 8
In reasoning that the NLRB had not substantially justified its position,
the Fourth Circuit in Tyler did not focus exclusively on the NLRB's civil litiga-
tion position as the Natural Resources court suggested.9 Rather, the Tyler
court focused correctly on both the NLRB agency and litigation positions in
determining whether the NLRB's position was substantially justified. 60 The
terms of the Act61 as well as the Act's legislative history62 clearly indicate that
672 F.2d 426, 430-31 (5th Cir. 1982) (court focused exclusively on government's civil litigation
position in determining whether government's position was substantially justified); supra text
accompanying note 39 (Fourth Circuit focused on both government's civil litigating position and
agency position in determining whether government's position was substantially justified).
55. 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
56. 703 F.2d 700, 707 (3d Cir. 1983). In finding that the EPA could not substantially justify
its failure to establish standards for pollutants in treatment works, the Natural Resources court
interpreted the Act's substantially justified standard to focus on agency actions that require a
party to file suit. Id.; see 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (procedure for establishing
pollutant standards).
57. 703 F.2d at.706-07.
58. Cf. infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit correctly interpreted Act
to refer to both agency conduct and government's litigating position in determining whether govern-
ment's position was substantially justified).
59. See Tyler Business Serv. v. NLRB, 695 F.2d 73, 75-76 (4th Cir. 1982) (Fourth Circuit
interpreted Act's substantially justified standard to refer to agency level proceedings and pro-
ceedings on judicial review).
60. See id.; infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit's focus on govern-
ment's position at whichever level party seeks to recover fees was correct interpretation of Act).
61. See 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981). Agencies may award prevailing parties fees
and expenses unless an adjudicative officer finds that the government's position was substantially
justified. Id. Courts reviewing underlying agency adjudications may award fees and expenses
pursuant to the Act. Id. § 504(c)(1). A court may award reasonable fees and expenses of at-
torneys to prevailing parties in any civil action that a party brings against the government or
against any federal agency or government official acting in his or her official capacity. See 28
U.S.C. § 2412(b) (Supp. V 1981); supra notes 10 & 15 (Act's procedures for recovering fees in
agency adjudication and civil litigation).
62. See H.R. RE'. No. 1418, supra note 3, at 4987-88. The Act permits courts to award
attorney fees and expenses that parties incur in civil litigation against the government if the court
finds the government's position was not substantially justified. Id. The Act also permits parties
who prevail in adversary adjudications to recover fees and expenses if the agency's position was
not substantially justified. Id. at 4988-89. The Act specifically allows for the payment of attorney
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for purposes of determining whether the government's position was substan-
tially justified, the Act applies to both an agency's actions during administrative
proceedings and an agency's position during subsequent civil proceedings. 63
The Third Circuit's exclusive focus in Natural Resources on agency level pro-
ceedings would allow an agency to avoid liability under the Act for a civil
litigation position that was not substantially justified so long as the agency
had conducted itself reasonably during prior agency adjudicative proceedings. 61
In contrast, for purposes of determining whether the NLRB's position was
substantially justified, the Fourth Circuit correctly interpreted the Act to refer
to the government's position as a party at whatever level proceeding a court
or agency reviews for the purpose of granting a fee award. 65
In holding that the Act refers to both the government's position in ad-
ministrative proceedings and in subsequent litigation, the District of Colum-
bia Circuit in Photo Data, Inc. v. Sawyer"6 supported the Fourth Circuit's
holding in Tyler.67 The Photo Data court considered whether the Government
Printing Office's refusal to grant a contract to a party whose bid had been
the lowest constituted unreasonable governmental conduct within the mean-
ing of the Act." In finding that the Government Printing Office could not
substantially justify its position denying the contract to the lowest bidder, the
fees to parties who prevail in civil actions against the government. H.R. REP. No. 1434, supra
note 3, at 5014. The Act also requires a federal agency to award prevailing parties fees and ex-
penses unless the agency's adjudicative officer finds that the agency's position was substantially
justified. Id. at 5010.
63. See Tyler Business Serv. v. NLRB, 695 F.2d 73, 75 (4th Cir. 1982). In interpreting
the Act to refer to the government's position as a party in prosecuting or defending the litigation
at whichever level proceeding is under review for an award of fees, the Fourth Circuit compromises
the position of courts that focus exclusively on the government's civil litigating posture and the
position of courts that focus exclusively on the agency's conduct. See id. Compare Natural Resources
Defense Council v. EPA, 703 F.2d 700, 706 (3d Cir. 1983) (Act focuses on underlying agency
conduct) with Broad Ave. Laundry & Tailoring v. United States, 693 F.2d 1387, 1390-91 (Fed.
Cir. 1982) (Act focuses exclusively on government's position in civil litigation) and S&H Riggers
& Erectors, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 672 F.2d 426, 430-31 (5th
Cir. 1982) (Act focuses on government's civil litigating position).
64. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 703 F.2d 700, 706-07 (3d Cir. 1983)
(court stated that exclusive focus on government's litigation position during civil proceedings
would permit agency to engage in improper conduct during administrative proceeding and avoid
liability under Act); supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit properly construed
Act to refer to both agency's conduct and government's position in civil litigation).
65. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text (Congress intended Act's substantially
justified standard to refer to government's position during both agency and civil proceedings).
66. 533 F. Supp. 348 (D.D.C. 1982).
67. Id. at 352; see supra note 39 and accompanying text (Tyler court held that Act's substan-
tially justified standard referred to government's position at whichever level of proceeding party
sought to recover fees).
68. 533 F. Supp. at 352-53. In Photo Data v. Sawyer, the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia stated that the Government Printing Office's (GPO) rejection of
a party's low bid for a contract on which the GPO had invited the party to bid was the sort
of conduct Congress intended the Act to prevent. Id.; see supra notes I & 2 and accompanying
text (Act provides incentive to contest unreasonable governmental conduct).
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Photo Data court stated that a court must consider both the government's
agency position and the government's subsequent civil litigation position in
determining whether the government's position was substantially justified.69
The Fourth Circuit in Tyler similarly interpreted the Act to refer to both the
government's conduct during agency proceedings and the government's subse-
quent litigation position in determining whether the government's position was
substantially justified.7" No other circuit has addressed whether a court should
review both the government's conduct during agency proceedings and the
government's position during civil litigation in determining whether the govern-
ment's position was substantially justified within the meaning of the Act.7
In addition to determining that the Act refers to the government's posi-
tion during both administrative and civil proceedings, the Fourth Circuit re-
solved which attorney fees the Act entitles a plaintiff to recover.72 Govern-
ment agencies have argued that the Act does not entitle a party to recover
fees that a party incurred prior to the Act's effective date.7 3 The Fourth Cir-
cuit correctly construed the Act, however, to apply to fees and expenses that
parties incur in connection with cases pending on the Act's effective date.
74
69. 533 F. Supp. at 352-53. In refusing the party's low bid in Photo Data, the GPO's Con-
tracting Officer had relied on a GPO finding that Photo Data, Inc. was irresponsible. Id. at
349. On review, the Photo Data court found that the GPO's position was not substantially justified
because the GPO could not substantiate its finding that Photo Data was irresponsible. Id. at 351.
70. See supra notes 39-40 & 61-63 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit correctly inter-
preted Act to focus on both agency's actions and government's litigating position).
71. But see Broad Ave. Laundry & Tailoring v. United States, 693 F.2d 1387, 1390 (Fed.
Cir. 1982). In Broad Ave., the District of Columbia Circuit interpreted the Act's substantially
justified standard to refer exclusively to the government's civil litigation position as opposed to
the government's position in prior administrative proceedings. Id. Broad Ave. is distinguishable
from the present case,however, in that the plaintiff in BroadAve. sought attorney fees attributable
only to subsequent civil proceedings whereas Tyler sought to recover attorney fees that he had
incurred during both administrative and subsequent civil proceedings. Id.; see Tyler Business Serv.
v. NLRB, 695 F.2d 73, 76-77 (4th Cir. 1982) (Tyler claimed attorney fees that he incurred during
proceedings before both NLRB and Fourth Circuit).
72. See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text (case must be pending on Act's effective
date for party to recover fees).
73. See United States v. Citizens Siate Bank, 668 F.2d 444, 446 (8th Cir. 1982) (Internal
Revenue Service argued that expenses party incurred prior to effective date of Act were not
recoverable); Underwood v. Pierce, 547 F. Supp. 256, 260-61 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (counsel for Housing
& Urban Development Administration argued that Act precluded party from recovering fees for
work performed prior to effective date of Act); Shumate v. Harris, 544 F. Supp. 779, 782-83
(W.D.N.C. 1982) (Secretary of Health and Human Services argued that party may not recover
expenses attributable to period before Act's effective date); Photo Data, Inc. v. Sawyer, 533
F. Supp., 348, 350-51 (D.D.C. 1982) (Government Printing Office sought to limit party's recovery
to fees that party incurred prior to Act's effective date).
74. See United States v. Citizens State Bank, 668 F.2d 444, 446 (8th Cir. 1982) (fees that
party incurred prior to Act's effective date are recoverable so long as case was pending on Act's
effective date); Underwood v. Pierce, 547 F. Supp. 256, 260-61 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (courts con-
sistently have approved awards of attorney fees for work that attorneys performed prior to effec-
tive date of recovery acts); Shumate v. Harris, 544 F. Supp. 779, 782-83 (W.D.N.C. 1982) (Act's
effective date does not bar award of fees if case was pending on effective date); Wolverton v.
Schweiker, 533 F. Supp. 420, 423 (D. Idaho 1982) (plain meaning of Act is contrary to notion
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The Fourth Circuit was correct in denying Tyler fees and expenses that he
had incurred during the NLRB administrative proceedings, however, because
the NLRB administrative proceedings concluded prior to the effective date
of the Act and therefore were not pending on the Act's effective date." In
S & H Riggers & Erectors, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Commission,"6 the Fifth Circuit, like the Tyler court, declined to view pro-
ceedings on appeal as mere continuations of agency adversary adjudications
for the purpose of determining whether the case was pending on the effective
date of the Act. 7 No other court has ruled to the contrary."
In Tyler, a party who prevailed at an NLRB administrative hearing peti-
tioned the Fourth Circuit to recover his litigation costs and expenses pursuant
to the Equal Access to Justice Act. 7" The Fourth Circuit correctly held that
the party could recover attorney fees connected with civil litigation before the
Fourth Circuit.8 The Tyler court was also correct in holding that the effective
date of the Act barred the recovery of fees that Tyler had incurred during
administrative proceedings before the NLRB.8 ' The Fourth Circuit's decision
that party may not recover fees that party incurred prior to Act's effective date); Photo Data,
Inc. v. Sawyer, 533 F. Supp. 348, 350-51 (D.D.C. 1982) (to construe Act to bifurcate cases on
Act's effective date would eschew purpose of Act).
75. See 5 U.S.C. § 504 note (Supp. V 1981). Section 208 of the Act states that the Act
shall apply to any adversary adjudication or civil action pending on or commenced on or about
October 1, 1981. Id. Tyler's proceedings before the Board concluded on August 17, 1981, when
the Board denied Tyler's motion for reconsideration. Tyler Business Serv. v. NLRB, 695 F.2d
73, 77 (4th Cir. 1982). Because the Act clearly distinguishes between administrative hearing pro-
ceedings and civil proceedings on judicial review, Tyler's Board proceedings ended on August
17, 1981, before the Act took effect on October 1, 1981. See 5 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (Supp. V
1981) (adjudicative officer's denial of petition for appeal is final).
76. 672 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1982).
77. Id. at 428. The Fifth Circuit in S&H Riggers & Erectors v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Comm'n stated that an agency adversary adjudication on appeal on October 1, 1981,
the effective date of the Act, is not pending on October 1, 1981, within the meaning of the Act.
Id. Because the Act distinguishes between proceedings on the agency level and proceedings on
appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that courts should not view agency and civil proceedings as a single
continuing proceeding in determining whether a case is pending. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(3)
(Supp. V 1981) (separate procedures for recovering fees in agency adjudications and civil pro-
ceedings); supra note 75 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit correctly determined that Board
proceeding was not pending on effective date of Act).
78. See, e.g., Wolverton v. Schweiker, 533 F. Supp. 420, 423 (D. Idaho 1982) (civil action
or adversary adjudication must be pending on Act's effective date for Act to apply); Berman
v. Schweiker, 531 F. Supp. 1149, 1151 (N.D. II1. 1982) (case no longer pending once period for
appeal had expired); United States v. 319.46 Acres of Land More or Less, 508 F. Supp. 288,
291-92 (W.D. Okla. 1981) (effective date of Act barred recovery of fees in case decided prior
to October 1, 1981).
79. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text (NLRB overruled administrative law judge's
findings).
80. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text (NLRB did not substantially justify posi-
tion that Tyler fired Lane for engaging in protected concerted activity).
81. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text (courts should not view agency and civil
proceedings as single continuous proceeding in determining whether case was pending on Act's
effective date).
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